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Abstract
Gentrification and income segregation are both poorly understood phenomena in terms of their
causes and effects as is the relationship between the two topics. Even less is known in the
context of small cities and over the time period spanning the last few decades. In this study
public data from the U.S. Census, the American Community Survey and the Washington County
Assessor's office has been used to measure economic gentrification in Fayetteville, Arkansas
using an index based on property values and median rent prices and how much they have
changed between 2000 and 2015. Then, using U.S. Census and American Community Survey
disaggregated income data, changes in income segregation were calculated over the same time
period using four different measures: segregation of poverty, segregation of affluence, entropy,
and a segregation index. Each measure of gentrification and segregation was calculated for each
census block group in Fayetteville before analyzing correlation and the lack thereof both
visually, by using a series of maps, and by testing for statistical correlation between the
gentrification index and each income segregation measure. While this study appears to reveal
patterns of gentrification and increased income segregation in Fayetteville over the study period,
evidence of correlation is non-existent to weak with results being largely inconclusive due to the
small geographical size of the study area among other limitations.
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Introduction
The topics of this paper, economic segregation and gentrification, are examples of
problems without obvious solutions. Both have often been created or exasperated in an attempt
to solve other problems. Both are symptoms of economic inequality and racial prejudice
extending further into history than anyone knows. Each has been considered as a solution to the
other and yet the relationship between them is currently poorly understood.
This era is one where data is, for better or worse, more plentiful and readily available
than at any point in human history. Scientists rejoice at the opportunity to analyze mistakes from
the past and successes alike in an effort to better understand how the world works and to find the
best path forward. And yet the case is often that more information leads to more questions than
answers. All too frequently, yesterday’s breakthrough in urban planning is today’s lesson of
what not to do.
The purpose of this paper is to learn more about the relationship between economic
segregation and gentrification. First, a review and a history of the existing literature on income
segregation and on gentrification will be presented. Then, an attempt will be made to identify
and measure both phenomena using publicly available data at two different points in time.
Segregation will be measured using four different analyses of disaggregated income data at the
census block group level. Property values and rent data will be used to calculate the economic
intensity of gentrification.
Next, those measurements will be analyzed to determine the relationship between
changes at the neighborhood level over the time period. The results will be measured for
correlation in an attempt to determine if there is a relationship between economic segregation
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and gentrification in Fayetteville. Lastly, an effort will be made via an in depth discussion of the
results to account for changes and patterns using details of the study area’s urban geography.
While most studies on these topics have looked at broad data from metropolitan areas
across the country or have more intimately inspected larger cities, the subject here is Fayetteville,
Arkansas, a small, rapidly growing college town in the Ozark Mountains. While it appears that
municipalities at every level of the urban hierarchy have begun to feel the effects of
gentrification, this detailed approach will investigate the seriousness of this issue in a small city
with low residential density during a period of high population growth.
Broadening the understanding of these forces individually as well as any possible
relationships between them, or lack thereof, will hopefully strengthen the possibility for creating
solutions and evolving policy to address the existing problems in urban society in a way which
minimizes the development or exasperation of others.
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Literature Review
Economic Segregation
Economic segregation, also referred to as “income segregation” or “class segregation,”
has a fairly small body of literature relative to similar subjects such as racial segregation and
income inequality. This is despite the topic becoming ever more relevant in the United States
over the last several decades. Jargowsky (1995, p. 1) defines economic segregation as “the
spatial segregation of households by income or social class.”
Economic segregation can be caused by a number of variables, such as changes to the
economic and cultural structure of a metropolitan area, as well as by processes such as
urbanization and suburbanization which occur both in the United States and abroad. Income
inequality, while not the same as income segregation, can have a profound effect on economic
segregation and is closely correlated. Economic segregation appears to take place at different
speeds and varying intensities for different races and locations but the underlying trends
generally remain similar. The effects of economic segregation are not fully understood but
appear to be self-perpetuating both among individual families and residents, and also within
society at large.
Causes
Economic segregation is “a complex, multi-dimensional phenomenon (Reardon &
Bischoff, 2011, p. 1093),” the causes of which are not fully understood. Growth in income
inequality and urbanization as well as a general shift in the economy away from manufacturing
over the last several decades are all heavily correlated with the rise in economic segregation. In
addition, other factors such as racial segregation/integration, public policy, and geography all
have closely intertwined but complex relationships with economic segregation.
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Tiebout (1956) described residential sorting as a product of the free market. In Tiebout's
model, shopping for a home is like shopping for a residential bundle. When a family or
individual decides to live somewhere, they are also deciding which public services into which
they are buying and for which they will be paying. Assuming perfect mobility and perfect
information, consumers will completely sort themselves by preferences in amenities. However,
mobility costs money and so do social services. Therefore in the real world, where most
consumers simply want good social services such as quality education and protection from
violence, the most desirable residential bundles go to those who can afford them.
Income inequality, while not synonymous with economic segregation, is necessary for its
existence. “Income segregation also requires the presence of income-correlated residential
preferences, an income-based housing market, and/or housing policies that link income to
residential location (Reardon & Bischoff, 2011, p. 1102).” However, increasing poverty, income
inequality, and economic segregation have not always been the status quo. For decades
following the post-World War II era, prosperity was on the rise and inequality and segregation
by income were declining.
In the 1970s, there were several changes in the structure of American culture and the
economy that led to a growth in income inequality which has persisted ever since. One was a
shift in the job market away from manufacturing. The United States and in particular, central
cities lost many manufacturing jobs to other countries and other industries. Many of these jobs
were replaced with non-unionized jobs either in low-paying service and retail industries or by
higher paying positions requiring computer skills or higher-education which were increasingly
located outside of the central city. At the same time the use of temporary workers increased and
the real value of the minimum wage declined due to inflation (Florida, 2017; Jones & Weinberg,
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2000; Massey & Fischer, 2000). In addition, the shift from agricultural employment had been
well underway for some time. The consequences of this were a rapid influx of the population to
metropolitan areas, most of whom were poor. At the same time, households were becoming
more fragmented and thereby less monetarily efficient as extended families less commonly
occupied the same dwelling.
The connection between income inequality and economic segregation is not fully
understood but research has shown that “there is a strong and robust relationship between withinrace metropolitan area income inequality and within-race metropolitan area income segregation”
(Reardon & Bischoff, 2011, p. 1136), particularly in black families. “In metropolitan areas and
years when black income inequality is largest, the highest-earning 10% of black families are
much more segregated from the lower 90% of black families than when and where black income
inequality is low” (Reardon & Bischoff, 2011, p. 1134). Income inequality however, is not the
only factor in within-race economic segregation. Bischoff and Reardon (2014) note that while
income inequality hasn't grown among blacks between 1990 and 2010, income segregation has.
The growth of income inequality among Hispanics in the 1990s was existent but low, and did not
happen in the 2000s, but as with the black population the growth of within-race economic
segregation has continued to grow.
Reardon and Bischoff (2011) also find that income inequality affects income segregation
mainly through the process of the affluent relocating themselves. “As inequality increases, it
becomes less likely that rich and poor households are willing to pay similar amounts for a given
set of neighborhood amenities” (Watson, 2009, p. 822). This is a process that goes beyond ties
with income inequality and has begun to build upon itself. Since the widespread development of
the United States Interstate Highway System, many with the means to do so have self-segregated
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themselves to suburbs, taking with them: businesses, jobs, and tax money. This process has
many negative effects on the lower-income residents. In general, sprawl makes it more difficult
for those without a vehicle to get to other places as those places become further away. In
addition, those who leave are often those who pay the most in taxes which leaves the inner cities
vastly underfunded for infrastructure and social amenities. “If high-income households are not
clustered together, then they may help to fund social services and institutions that serve lowerincome populations” (Reardon & Bischoff, 2011, p. 1100). This leaves those in the less affluent
areas with less access to jobs, quality education and social opportunities, and also more exposed
to violence and crime. As the central cities deteriorate, more and more people who can afford to
leave, do so in order to gain access to better social amenities and a safer environment for
themselves and their families. Therefore, the self-segregation of affluence enables the
segregation of poverty which further perpetuates the segregation of affluence (Farley, 1977;
Reardon & Bischoff, 2011; Yang & Jargowsky, 2006).
The suburban areas are sometimes autonomous communities with their own governments
and social services. Public policy, particularly in those independent, suburban jurisdictions, is
often encouraging of segregation as it is at times written by those who chose to live only near
neighbors with similar incomes and ethnic backgrounds. Zoning regulations or neighborhood
covenants are put in place that require large lot sizes or which ban multifamily dwelling units
from being constructed (Reardon & Bischoff, 2011). This keeps the price of living in the
neighborhood or suburban community above what is affordable for lower-income families and
effectively limits residents to certain income minimums. Lower-income families in the
metropolitan area are then by default relegated to neighborhoods typically with older housing
units, deteriorating infrastructure, and mostly other low-income families (Yang & Jargowsky,
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2006). The way in which government subsidized housing is addressed by the government can
also promote economic segregation. In the past, public housing projects have been built as
isolated neighborhoods, without commercial activity and with an entire population in poverty.
This can segregate thousands of economically similar families into a single mega-block,
sometimes even further isolated within the city geographically.
While the general trends hold strong across most studies, the intensity of economic
segregation fluctuates throughout the country depending on a number of geographic variables
(Sharkey & Graham, 2013). For instance, nationally the rich and the poor have become more
evenly distributed over the last half-century and income segregation has changed very little since
1990, while within metropolitan areas rich and poor have become increasingly more segregated
during this time, income segregation having grown nearly 10% during the 2000s (Massey &
Fischer, 2003; Reardon, et al., 2015). The extent to which residents of different income classes
are segregated varies significantly from city to city as well. “In any given year, segregation is
two to three times as high in the most segregated 10 percent of metropolitan areas as in the least
segregated 10 percent” (Bischoff & Reardon, 2014, p. 216) and as much as six times higher in
the most segregated cities (Reardon, et al., 2015). The trends are similar in smaller and larger
metropolitan areas but smaller metropolitan areas are less segregated by income and began the
modern era of economic segregation later. Larger metropolitan areas tend to be more segregated
as the size allows for macro-scale segregation, which is often not possible in smaller cities and
affects society differently. “Micro-scale residential segregation patterns are likely to affect
pedestrian contact patterns and may be more consequential for children and the elderly, who are
often more geographically constrained than young and middle-aged adults...macro-scale
segregation patterns may be more likely to affect the spatial distribution of economic,
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institutional, and political resources” (Reardon & Bischoff, 2011, p. 1099). The effect of density
on economic segregation is unclear and appears to have a positive correlation, but one that tapers
and eventually reverses at a high enough density with segregation occurring in dense central
cities as well as in suburbs (Farley, 1977; Yang & Jargowsky, 2006).
Race
Historically racial segregation and economic segregation in the United States have been
nearly synonymous. The black population has been much more impoverished for the entirety of
the country's history and the white population as a whole has generally made an effort to live in a
different city or neighborhood. In the last few decades the racial composition of the United
States has become more complex and public perception of living in an integrated area has
changed (Pettigrew, 1973). However, while racial segregation has been declining modestly, it is
still rampant in many metropolitan areas and overall more complete than economic segregation
(Jargowsky, 1995). It is also apparent that while not mutually exclusive, the two topics are
“empirically entangled...implying the necessity of examining income segregation separately by
race as well as for the population as a whole” (Reardon & Bischoff, 2011, p. 1093).
While racial segregation is often attributed to economic differences, research shows that
this is not the whole story and in fact is largely due to the self-segregation of the white
population. The issue is much broader than simply the segregation of poor black residents in
inner-city ghettos and while this has been a large component that should be examined, the larger
patterns and processes at work will be missed by looking no further (Massey, 1996). If income
was responsible alone we could expect to see class segregation patterns hold constant across
races, but this is not the case. There are a disproportionate number of lower-class whites living
in suburbs and a similarly disproportionate number of high-income blacks living in central cities,
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which indicates that the processes involved in income segregation may be different across races
(Farley, 1977; Kain, 1986).
To add to the complexity, there is also the issue of within-race economic segregation
which also has an embroiled relationship with the economic segregation of the entire population.
Though not necessarily by choice, the black population was less internally, economically
separated than the white population prior to the 1970s. White prejudice was rampant in every
part of the residential sorting process, affecting what jobs black citizens were able to be hired for,
how much money they would make, the ability of black families to live in certain neighborhoods
or rent from certain landlords and even the retention of white neighbors (Pettigrew, 1973).
However, changes in policy and public perception during this decade made it much more
achievable, though far from equally so, for black people to move up in their careers and thereby
economic ladders from the lower-class into middle or upper-class income brackets. At the same
time the black population in suburbs and higher-income neighborhoods began to grow. This
push away from absolute racial segregation actually increased economic segregation overall and
especially within-race economic segregation for black families (Bischoff & Reardon, 2014).
Even now, after decades of social progress, different races are still affected unequally by income
segregation.
Black and Hispanic households are located, on average, in neighborhoods where the
poverty rate is significantly higher than that of non-Hispanic whites. In particular,
predominantly black neighborhoods, regardless of socioeconomic composition, continue
to be spatially isolated in areas of severe disadvantage...Although low-income households
of all races are located disproportionately in low-income neighborhoods, the patterns are
more pronounced for black and Hispanic households...the average affluent (earning more
than $75,000 per year) black or Hispanic household is located in a poorer neighborhood
than the average lower income (earning less than $40,000) white household (Reardon, et
al., 2015, p. 80).
It should be noted that these trends regarding Hispanic, Asian, Native American and other ethnic
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populations are present but less pronounced in the current research. The literature including
these groups and especially focusing on them in the context of economic segregation is sparse
and in need of elaboration.
Growth
During the 1930s, the economic condition of the United States was grim, with poverty
rates and inequality both extraordinarily high. Following World War II, the U.S. economy was
headed in the opposite direction. In about 25 years, the poverty rate dropped from 34% to 11%
while the percentage of families making a middle-class income increased from 40% to 66%.
These trends began to reverse during the 1970s however and by 1991 the economic distribution
in the United States was more skewed than it was in 1947 (Massey, 1996; Massey & Eggers,
1993). Many of the causes discussed above, such the creation of a post-industrial economy,
federal and metropolitan policies that encouraged high-density, low-income housing projects,
and the desegregation of the black population, reached tipping points that led to a pulling apart of
the lower- and upper-classes both economically and socially (Massey & Fischer, 2000; Reardon
& Bischoff, 2011). This change wasn't empirically evident until later however. During the
1970s these changes applied mostly to poor families and minorities with income segregation and
inequality stagnating or even continuing at a slight decline for most whites. Beginning in the
1980s, the trends were in full swing (Jones & Weinberg, 2000). During this time poverty,
income inequality, and economic segregation rose for every racial group by multiple measures at
undeniable levels (Bischoff & Reardon, 2014; Reardon & Bischoff, 2011). “Between 1970 and
1990...poverty areas grew in terms of the number of tracts, the total population, the percentage of
the overall population, the percentage of poor persons living in them, and land area” (Yang &
Jargowsky, 2006, p. 254).
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The 1990s provided significantly different results however, which many took as an
indication that the problem of economic segregation was a phase that had dwindled into the past.
After two decades of increasing economic segregation, during the 1990s this stalled for most of
the population, though not for black families. By 1990 the problem had been recognized and
addressed in many places through federal and local policies. New public housing had shifted
largely to scattered-site approaches and mixed-income designs while the high-density megaprojects were being demolished. There were more and more publicly incentivized programs to
support the development of mixed-income, mixed-use neighborhoods. And of course, the 1990s
was one of the most economically prosperous decades in the nation's history (Reardon &
Bischoff, 2011; Yang & Jargowsky, 2006). After data became available, it became apparent
however that the unusual economic boom of the 1990s was mostly responsible for keeping the
growth of economic segregation at bay and it is unlikely that the country would be able to
maintain or regularly repeat such economic prosperity (Yang & Jargowsky, 2006). The 2000s
had rapid and widespread growth in economic segregation similar to that of the 1980s. In
particular, the segregation of affluence was greater in the 2000s than in the previous three
decades (Bischoff & Reardon, 2014; Reardon, et al., 2015).
Effects
Economic segregation can have a multitude of direct and indirect effects on segregated
residents as well as society at large. The money paid into the local civic system is directly
responsible for the quality of services received in turn (Tiebout, 1956). Therefore, those
neighborhoods with a concentration of affluence will have well-funded schools, fire departments,
police officers, hospitals, and infrastructure. On the other hand, when there is a concentration of
low-income earning residents, there is likely very little money being paid into these services.
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Poorer families pay less in income tax and sales tax and are less likely to be able to support tax
paying businesses as well. Consequently, these neighborhoods often have inferior social
institutions providing lower quality and insufficient levels of education, protection, and health
care (Reardon & Bischoff, 2011; Bischoff & Reardon, 2014).
In addition, residents of impoverished neighborhoods are physically exposed to different
people and situations than those living in areas of affluence. “Income sorting affects the
distribution of role models, peers, and social networks” (Watson, 2009, p. 820). Economic
mobility is more feasible when there is exposure to, and social interaction with, members of
other social classes. Therefore, it is increasingly difficult for people born into a low-income
family in a low-income neighborhood to ever fit the description of any economic classification
but low-income (Sharkey & Graham, 2013). The chances of a child growing up and getting a
higher education is much greater if that child knows somebody with a higher education.
Conversely, children in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty are more likely to be exposed to
violence, crime, and disease (Massey, 1996; Reardon, et al., 2015). Furthermore, as affluent
families are further geographically segregated from, and therefore less exposed to impoverished
families, the less in common the two groups will have and the farther apart the social and
political interests of the affluent and impoverished will become (Massey & Fischer, 2003).
The ultimate effect of economic segregation is the perpetuation of the very processes that
cause the segregation in the first place. The better the quality of the social amenities and
environment of a neighborhood the more desirable it will be to live there and the more expensive
(Reardon & Bischoff, 2011; Tiebout, 1956). Conversely, as a neighborhood is less and less able
to fund the social amenities needed for improvement, the more likely it is that those who are
paying the most into the system and can afford to leave, will leave (Massey, 1996). This leaves
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the neighborhood with an even slimmer chance of being able to afford improvements that would
encourage investment and residents with an even slimmer chance of escaping poverty. “Even in
those places that have large differences in the incomes between the richest and poorest
households, it is the degree to which their neighborhoods are economically segregated that
matters more for economic mobility” (Sharkey & Graham, 2013).
Measurement
One glaring obstacle in the literature on economic segregation is the difficulty of
measuring it. There are almost as many methods of measurement as there are studies on the
topic. Early studies used dissimilarity indexes, which have been used to measure racial
segregation and income inequality, such as the Gini coefficient and the P* Isolation index
(Farley, 1977; Jones & Weinberg, 2000; Massey, 1996; Massey & Eggers, 1993; Massey &
Fischer, 2003). The problem with these methods is that they are suitable for only two variables,
which is not a sufficiently detailed approach to the linear value of income (Watson, 2009). The
Theil entropy measure is able to compare several categories but the categories are still arbitrarily
decided on by the user and affected by underlying distribution (Jargowsky, 1996; Watson, 2009;
Yang & Jargowsky, 2006). The Neighborhood Sorting Index (Jargowsky, 1996) uses correlation
ratios but requires an estimation of total variance by the user (Watson, 2009). The variance of
the natural logarithm of income or VLOG analysis (Taylor, 2007) uses raw numbers in an
attempt to bypass the shrinking middle class which inflates the percentage of low- and highincome families. However, the lack of normalization can be misleading. The Centile Gap Index
(Watson, 2009) and the Rank-order information theory index (Reardon & Bischoff, 2011) use
only percentiles and ranks to measure neighbors' proximity to each other and bypassing the
arbitrary effects of inflation and inequality. One problem with these is that they don't provide
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disaggregated information about the neighborhoods (Bischoff & Reardon, 2014).
Unfortunately, there are several intrinsic problems with measuring economic segregation
which force researchers to make sacrifices or use multiple, differently flawed methods in order to
compare them and draw a conclusion.
Three features of publicly available census data hamper the measurement of income
segregation. First, household income is reported categorically (in sixteen categories in
the most recent census and the American Community Survey). Second, the number and
location of the income categories have changed over time. And third, the income
distribution itself changes over time (because of inflation or changing income inequality,
for example), so that even stable income category definitions do not correspond to the
same part of the income distribution at different times (Reardon, et al., 2015, p. 82).
As a result, it is also difficult to compare one study to another study that uses a different method
of measurement or a different sample size or location(s). The result is a lack of functional
continuity in the literature.
Gentrification
Depending on the lens through which it is being viewed, gentrification may appear to
integrate neighborhoods economically (Yang & Jarkowsky, 2006) or it may appear to segregate
neighborhoods even further (Krupka, 2008). “By definition” states Freeman (2009)
“gentrification introduces gentrifiers into relatively low-income neighbourhoods and would
therefore be thought to be associated with some increase in socioeconomic diversity there” (p.
2079). Freeman continues by adding that “one might assume this increase in socioeconomic
diversity to be fleeting. That is, once gentrification commences, the original low-income
residents will be displaced in short order.” The classic narrative is easy to understand and yet
does not begin to address the breadth of real world scenarios. Florida (2017) argues that
“gentrification tends to take place either in older industrial neighborhoods, where few people live
anyway before the gentrification begins, or in working-class districts where homeowners benefit
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from the rising prices caused by gentrification” (p. 72). However, it is also important to note as
Boyle (2009) does that “where displacement is occurring, it can be extremely difficult to
measure” and furthermore “The absence of displacement does not equate an absence of impact”
(p. 8).
Due to the complex and abstract nature of gentrification, there is a fundamental failure of
agreement as to what gentrification is exactly, what or who causes it to occur and how severely it
is impacting communities. Several authors agree that gentrification occurs when a neighborhood
sees an increase in investment, higher income households, and property values (Atkinson, 2008;
Boyle, 2009; Freeman, 2009), all economic changes of which none are inherently negative. This
can be problematic for the general public and scholars alike, wary of even positive change and
who may be prone to label any urban development as gentrification. Alternatively, perceived
benefits may be misattributed to gentrification or the product of shortsighted interpretation from
a snapshot of transition. All of this works together to create a spray of blame and blurry analysis
leaving policy makers numb and ultimately inactive on the issue. A failure to clearly define and
distinguish gentrification from other types of neighborhood change has “reduced the bite of
critical studies of its localised appearance and has diminished policy maker interest” (Atkinson,
2008, p. 2634).
Causes
There are two primary schools on what has primarily driven gentrification: consumption
theory and production theory. Both theories are preceded by a handful of historic, urban
phenomena and the anthropological juggernaut of urbanization.
While the causes of gentrification are debatable and complex, there is a common
denominator among theories: more people occupying the same amount of land. While many
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American cities are still below the peak populations achieved prior to the mass suburbanization
of the 1950s, it is a fact that there are increasingly more people in the world and in most
countries as well as a higher percentage of people living in urban areas. The simple law of
supply and demand would dictate that a higher demand for the same amount of a good (in this
case, urban space) will cause the market value to go up. While urban space is certainly affected
by supply and demand, it is also tugged and pushed by other aspects of the market, distorting the
familiar graph into something which can be difficult to comprehend. “Competing uses are
geographically sorted in the first place through the ground-rent system. Yet there is certainly no
guarantee of effective integration” notes Smith (1984, p. 184-185). “To the extent that land itself
becomes an object of speculative exchange and development, the integrative function of ground
rent is disrupted.” Investors buying much larger portions of the market than are required for
their personal needs can create artificial shortages in supply. This forces the market rate to skew
upwards since demand not only remains steady, but essentially cannot decline. Unlike other
goods which may just stay on the shelf if the price is too high, housing is a fundamental
necessity with few alternatives besides homelessness. Therefore, consumers will pay what is
required if at all possible.
Furthermore, the basic structure of the American city has been undergoing some
fundamental changes during the last few decades. To understand the current restructuring it is
important to understand a previous, massive urban restructuring which began to accelerate in the
first half of the 20th century: suburbanization. A combination of events, technology, policy, and
public perception led to a large migration of city dwellers to smaller, less dense, bedroom
communities outside of the cities proper. Vehicles were cheaper than ever to buy and fuel.
Houses were being constructed more quickly and cheaply than in the past due to technological
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advances as well as vertical and horizontal industry consolidation. At the same time federally
insured home loans made the prospect of owning attainable for many, including veterans
returning from World War II (Judd & Swanstrom, 2015, p. 155). It became common to live
several miles from the city center and commute to work by driving a vehicle (which many
middle-class families had for the first time) on the brand new freeways funded by the National
Interstate and Defense Highways Act of 1956. Commutes which would have previously taken
much longer were transformed into a 20 to 40-minute middle-class ritual.
A large portion of those who could afford to leave crowded cities for what was promised
to be a small-town, home owning opportunity, did so. For some this was a more promising place
to raise a family. Others were less discreet about their xenophobically motivated white flight as
“increasingly, suburban residents regarded the cities as reservations for blacks” (Judd &
Swanstrom, 2015, p. 158). Those who could not afford to do so were left in the underpopulated,
underfunded, deteriorating city centers. By the 1960s American cities had been completely
rearranged into a brand new, sprawling urban geography centered around automotive
transportation.
As inner-cities became more sparsely populated, properties were not maintained and
infrastructure became dilapidated due to an insufficient tax base. Property values in turn began
to decline. Meanwhile in the suburbs, property values were increasing and the amount of
greenfield space available for development began to shrink as the inner, and subsequently outer
peripheral rings began to fill out with spatially inefficient, inhumanly scaled development. As
rent gaps emerged in midtowns and downtowns across the country, it gradually began to make
more financial sense for developers to invest in central cities once again (Smith, 1979, p.546).
Likewise, the value of city living with its proximity to amenities, jobs and public transit was
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gaining in appeal to consumers. Modern technology and regulation had negated a lot of the
reasons people had left in the first place such as pollution and sanitation woes and suburbanites’
commutes had only become longer and less pleasant as open roads began to fill up due to an
exponential increase in sprawl, suburbanization and autocentric development. Additionally,
according to Hwang (2016) who studied the steady “influx of immigrants to low-cost central-city
neighborhoods” (p. 191) that took place in 1970s and 1980s, “Asians and, in some conditions,
Hispanics served as early pioneers to many low-income neighborhoods in the wake of urban
decline across U.S. cities” and “are positively associated with gentrification in neighborhoods”
(p. 211).
While it doesn’t appear that people have stopped living in or moving to the suburbs, there
are a lot of people moving to or staying in the cities proper. While suburbs continue to grow,
many central cities have seen large increases in population approaching or surpassing their presuburbanization numbers. “By many measures, downtowns and residential areas in the central
cities have been on the rebound since sometime in the 1990s” (Judd and Swanstrom, 2015, p.
166). This urban renaissance has some major differences from the traditional town form
however, the primary of which might be that contrary to 80 years ago, most urban households
have a car if not more than one now and are accustomed to an infrastructure which allows for the
use and storage of that car. The impact of the previous geographical urban restructuring also
means that many of the jobs previously located in the city have moved, with the people, to the
suburbs and many modern urban residents must continue to commute, but from the city to the
suburbs instead of the other way around.
Early gentrification theorists and many still today lean on the would-be natural series of
events that stem from supply and demand in market-driven economics. As Smith (1996) puts it,
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“they adopted what came to be referred to as a ‘consumption-side’ explanation whereby the
gamut of ‘neighborhood change’ is to be explained primarily in terms of who moves in and who
moves out” (p. 41). The question attempted to be answered is: “Why did so many middle and
upper-class metropolitan residents decide to return to more centrally located neighborhoods in
concert, flooding the market and driving up property values and rent prices”? The answer
according to consumption theorists is consumer preference (Atkinson, 2008; Boyle, 2009; Smith,
1979, 1996). A suburban born and bred generation became tired of the commute, aware of the
environmental implications of sprawl, and bored with suburban commercial districts and the strip
mall options which they provided, so they sold their single-family homes and bought townhouses
in the historic district. At the same time, suburban youth were moving to cities to study at
universities and found out they enjoyed utilizing public transit and twenty-four hour
conveniences, so instead of buying a yarded, bedroom community home after graduation they
rented a loft downtown. As urban neighborhoods adapted to accommodate the new residents, the
appeal and therefore demand, increased, eventually causing property values to increase
dramatically. “This process of neighborhood transformation is a natural, if wrenching, feature of
cities, which are perpetual works in progress. As they grow and change, their demography and
class structures shift” (Florida, 2017, p. 61).
Structuralists lean on the principle that social space is reproduced or organized in a way
that is designed to generate capital (Smith, 1984; Swyngedouw, 1992). According to production
theory the reason central cities are filling up and property values are escalating is because of a
concerted and calculated effort by developers, realtors and lenders to convince consumers that
the central city is where they need to be and they need to be there badly enough to pay
handsomely for the right. “To explain gentrification according to the gentrifiers' actions alone,
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while ignoring the role of builders, developers, landlords, mortgage lenders, government
agencies, real estate agents, and tenants, is excessively narrow” (Smith, 1979, p. 540). Once
developers realized they could maximize profits by selling smaller units for more money by
using geographical convenience as a marketing tactic, they began to utilize this by initially
razing and rebuilding empty lots or condemned structures with very low property value and
using the edgy allure of the urban jungle to sell luxury living and working space (Smith, 1996).
The self-fulfilling prophecy would later drive prices to the point where it would become
profitable to demolish neighborhoods of existing affordable housing to make way for units which
would be unaffordable to the diverse groups of creative people whose presence made the area
appealing to consumers in the first place. As property values increased, longtime residents were
no longer able to afford property taxes and were forced to sell their property and it no longer
made sense for landlords to continue maintaining and renting affordable units when it could be
much more profitable to sell or redevelop with luxury units.
The evidence for structuralism is extensive and has included now, well documented
processes such as redlining, callous urban renewal programs, and blatant racism in rental and real
estate markets, all examples of practices built into the system in order to produce profit at the
expense of minorities and less powerful individuals by reorganizing urban space on a large scale
(Boyle, 2009; Judd & Swanstrom, 2015; Reardon & Bischoff, 2011; Smith, 1996). That being
said, geographical trends and economic phenomena never occur in a vacuum. To explain
gentrification entirely using either consumption theory or production theory would be a gross
oversimplification. As Neil Smith distinctly put it in his 1979 article “Toward a Theory of
Gentrification: A Back to the City Movement by Capital, not People”:
A broader theory of gentrification must take the role of producers as well as consumers
into account, and when this is done, it appears that the needs of production - in particular
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the need to earn profit - are a more decisive initiative behind gentrification than consumer
preference. This is not to say in some naive way that consumption is the automatic
consequence of production, or that consumer preference is a totally passive effect caused
by production. Such would be a producer’s sovereignty theory, almost as one-sided as its
neoclassical counterpart. Rather, the relationship between production and consumption is
symbiotic, but it is a symbiosis in which production dominates. (p. 540)
This notion is widely accepted in modern literature with most research on gentrification from the
last few decades focusing more on the long term effects of this type of urban restructuring
(Krupka, 2008; Lees, 2008; Mordechay & Ayscue, 2017) or the policies designed to thwart or
guide the market-driven force (Boyle, 2009; Taylor, 2007). Most urbanists would say that it is a
result of a combination of these two theories and that every city has its own economic and
cultural history which creates a unique situation and yet is part of a much larger capitalist
structure of which gentrification is a natural product. “Territorial configuration is the spatial
embodiment of the circulation of capital, while changes in this territorial configuration are a
prerequisite for changes in the circulation of capital which, then, necessarily result in the
production of a new form of territorial configuration. (Swyngedouw, 1992, p. 425).
Gentrification as it is happening today, is at least in part, a painful inversion or relaxation of the
much less natural geographical urban restructuring of suburbanization.
Effects
It can be difficult to make a distinction between change and gentrification. When a
neighborhood is at stake, change can be polarizing and blame can be abundant. Gentrification is
highly politicized and the intricacy often overlooked as policies which intend to improve the
lives of residents in a particular neighborhood may have the long-term effect of facilitating
gentrification. Indrani Boyle summarizes the gentrification conundrum in the 2009 study
“Measuring Gentrification in the Interstate Corridor Urban Renewal Area”:
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Although gentrification can easily be tied to public goals, policies, and programs, the
causes of gentrification are complex. In theory, it follows that public investments in
declining areas increase the desirability of these neighborhoods. Improved infrastructure
and potential increases in property values are likely to draw new households. As these
are stated goals in most urban renewal plans, gentrification must be a considered
outcome.
It is both extraordinarily abstract and simultaneously visible from millions of Americans’ front
doors. To some it means the death of a neighborhood while others consider it to be synonymous
with the revitalization of a city. It is probably safe to say most policy makers are not striving for
gentrification and yet gentrification prevails as a side effect of policies intended to improve the
lives of urban dwellers.
The cultural effects of gentrification are perhaps the most easily noticed and the hardest
to define. Although cultural gentrification is not generally measured monetarily, it is inseparable
from the economic effects. During the heyday of suburbanization, culture creators thrived in the
underfunded, underpopulated, and undervalued urban areas largely abandoned by industry for
more spacious and less regulated property further out. Artists, artisans, writers, musicians, chefs,
performers, craftsmen and all sorts of other creatives tend to seek out affordable areas in
proximity to workspace, venues, and others with which to network, often “transforming old
factory lofts and warehouse spaces into studios and performance spaces” (Florida, 2017, p. 60).
The art districts created by the nature of these low-cost neighborhoods became destinations and
eventually were bought by investors, redeveloped, and marketed as desirable but adventurous
places to live for those seeking a “wild west” or “urban frontier” (Smith, 1996). Often inner-city
redevelopment began around and radiated from these districts. The warehouse which had been
converted to art studios would be redeveloped as pricey studio lofts and the dive which might
have been a shoe factory before hosting punk shows and slam poets, would be replaced with a
gallery for wealthy new residents to shop for wall decor.
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Gentrification tends to be characterized economically by an increase in living expenses.
As deteriorating structures and empty lots are replaced with new development, the value of the
developed property increases at first by the value of the new development and possibly even
more as an existing old structure can be a cost burden in itself. Additionally, the cost of adjacent
and nearby properties increase as they are no longer in proximity to the possibly unsightly or
hazardous structure or lot that preceded the new development. Now, what was once unoccupied
space is home to people who can afford to live in new developments. This begins a demand for
services. As the process continues, more dead spaces are converted to houses, condos,
commercial spaces, or offices and a once sleepy, low-income neighborhood can become a
thriving mixed-income community.
The addition of more middle-income and upper-income residents to a traditionally lowincome neighborhood has economic benefits. The increases in property values and therefore
property taxes support public services such as schools, fire departments, and roads. The
disposable income of the new-comers may support services which were previously unable to
thrive in the neighborhood but that can directly benefit low-income residents as well. An
example of this would be the addition of a green grocer to an urban food desert. The increased
density of a neighborhood makes transit more viable. Even if rent has increased, these new
benefits may save families money on expenses such as healthcare or vehicle maintenance.
Additionally, there may be more opportunities such as jobs, networking, and after-school
programs (Bischoff & Reardon, 2014; Mordechay & Ayscue, 2017; Reardon & Bischoff, 2011).
On the other hand, the popularity of the rejuvenated area causes property values to
increase and many landlords discover that they are able to find tenants willing to pay more
money for the same spaces. Others find it is more profitable to sell or redevelop their buildings
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than it is to pay an escalated property tax and maintain them for low-income tenants. “Their
opportunity cost of residence will mount and they will eventually sell their residence” (Krupka,
2018, p. 12). As the situation progresses, longtime tenants are sometimes unable to pay the
higher rents and established property owners may not be able to afford to pay higher property
taxes. Even some businesses that may be able to keep up with increased rents at first might
eventually lose their clientele as the demographics of the neighborhood continue to change. The
makeup of services and products offered locally will begin to move toward a more expensive
selection which appeals to the more financially well-off residents and the old timers who remain
may no longer be able to afford to support these local businesses or the travel necessary to reach
the services they need, causing even more displacement. Furthermore, those who are able to stay
may no longer feel like they are a part of a community. “It is therefore essential” states
Mordechay & Ayscue (2017) “that the gentrification process be managed to ensure that it creates
inclusive communities and schools, rather than displacing low-income residents and residents of
color” (p. 8).
Measurement
As the literature dances around an accepted definition for gentrification, so does the
methodology for measurement vary. Wyly & Hammel (2004) attempted to measure
gentrification by identifying the “inner city” as neighborhoods “that endured sustained
disinvestment in the postwar wave of urban development and suburbanization” along with
consulting “scholarly, applied, and local press literature to identify neighborhoods discussed in
terms of gentrification, revitalization, renewal, renaissance, and other familiar keywords.”
Afterwards “block-by-block field surveys of visible housing reinvestment” were taken to
confirm or disprove trends. Finally, the results were used to calibrate a predictive model, with
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the assumption that the risk of gentrification for modern inner city neighborhoods could be
forecast by using trends from the past few decades (p. 1219).
Boyle (2009) is critical of methods, and the lack thereof, used by The Portland
Development Commission to measure long term effects of an urban renewal program which
included portions of several historically African American neighborhoods. Boyle’s criticism
mainly focuses on insufficient detail as a result of using external data per the United States
Census. “Census data is only available in standardized geographical units, and cannot be tailored
to the boundaries of an urban renewal area.” While “the census allows us to evaluate population
characteristics that may provide clues about demographic changes...these characteristics cannot
be tied to individual housing units, or personal motivations.” Boyle goes on to describe “more
tailored” studies which could have included “household based studies,” allowing “researchers to
collect information from residents who have moved out of the study area, including the reasons
for these moves” and “unit-based studies” to “track individual housing units, and monitor
changes in rent, or even the demographics of residents at specific points in time” which would
have allowed “researchers to see whether the affordability of individual units is changing” (p.
13-15).
Mordechay & Ayscue (2017) use a method entirely based on changes in the composition
of race in Washington D.C. neighborhoods. The study, which seeks to measure the effect of
gentrification on school enrollment patterns, identifies 11 census tracts in the area which
“experienced an increase of 25 percentage points or more in white residents between 2000 and
2015.” Mordechay & Ayscue refer to these 11 census tracts as “the ‘fastest’ or ‘most rapidly’
gentrifying census tracts” and go on to mention that “in addition to the stark racial change across
these census tracts, when combined they experienced close to a two-fold increase in inflation-
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adjusted median income, compared to a citywide increase of 28% between 2000 and 2015” (p.
13).
While economic segregation has been around for a long time in different places around
the world, the scholarly exploration of this topic is young. The bodies of literature about related
topics such as racial segregation and income inequality are much larger. Gentrification on the
other hand is a relatively new phenomenon, at least in the way we understand it today as a
reaction of suburbanization, and has a large but muddy body of literature which has emerged in
the last three or four decades. Despite the seemingly obvious nexus, the long term relationship
between the two trends is still unclear. This is partially a result of the complexity involved in
measuring economic segregation, which involves geography, time, and income data, the linear
nature of which does not lend itself to segregation methodology. Likewise, gentrification is not
only difficult to measure but also to define. It is also partially due to the only decades old rerelevance of economic segregation in the United States which does correspond to the emergence
of modern gentrification as an urban force.
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Site
Fayetteville is the most populous of the four primary cities in the Northwest Arkansas
Metropolitan Area and has appeared to experience gentrification, displacement, and economic
segregation over the last few decades despite being a small city. The city’s proximity to several
large and growing corporate employers, the University of Arkansas, and natural beauty have all
brought growth in population and capital as well as abundant change. The University of
Arkansas is the state’s largest institution of higher education and has recently undergone a large
and rapid increase in student population. The university campus is centrally located and adjacent
to downtown Fayetteville as well as several historically residential neighborhoods and has
significantly altered the city’s core through direct expansion and studentification.
The population of Fayetteville at the time of the 2000 decennial census was 58,047 while
the population of the Northwest Arkansas Metropolitan area was 311,121. By 2015, estimates
put these numbers at 79,037 and 493,095 respectively. The number of housing units in
Fayetteville alone rose from 25,467 in 2000 to 36,398 by 2015. In addition to experiencing rapid
growth, there were some slight changes in the demographic composition of the population over
this time period as well. In 2000, the population of Fayetteville was 86.5% White, 5.1% Black
or African American, 2.6% Asian, 1.3% American Indian/Alaskan Native, 0.2% Native
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, with 2.0% identifying as some other race, 2.4% as two or more races,
and 4.9% were Hispanic or Latino (of any race). Estimates in 2015 showed slight racial
diversification in the population with Whites accounting for 82.0% of the population, 6.1% were
Black or African American, 3.6% were Asian, 0.9% were American Indian/Alaskan Native and
0.1% were Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander with 3.7% identifying as some other race, 3.6% as
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two or more races, and 7.3% were Hispanic or Latino of any race (United States Census, 2000;
American Community Survey, 2015).
Fayetteville is demographically younger, more educated, and lower-income than the rest
of the region. In 2000 the median age was 26.9 compared to 33 for the metropolitan area and in
Fayetteville 41.2% of those over the age of 25 had at least a Bachelor’s degree compared with
22.4% for the region as a whole. By 2015, estimates showed that these differences largely
remained in place, although the median age in Fayetteville had risen to 28, still quite a bit
younger than the median Northwest Arkansas at 33.6. The percent of the population in
Fayetteville over the age of 25 with at least a Bachelor’s degree rose to 46.6% and also rose
regionally, but was still substantially lower at 28.8%. The median household income in
Fayetteville in 2000 was $31,345 per year compared to $37,322 per year for the entire MSA.
While that number grew to $39,432 per year by 2015, Fayetteville actually grew further behind
Northwest Arkansas as a whole, where the median household income had increased to $49,147
(United States Census, 2000; American Community Survey, 2015).
Fayetteville is located on the Ozark Plateau and more specifically right along the border
of the Springfield Plateau and the Boston Mountains. Therefore, terrain is quite hilly to the east
and south and relatively flat to the north and west. Within the city limits there are quite a few
large hills but large portions of the city would be better described as gently sloping. The western
side of the city drains to the Illinois River watershed while the eastern portion of the city drains
to the White River watershed. In 2000 the city contained 44.49 square miles of land and water
and had a population density of 1,304.72 people per square mile. By 2015 the city had grown to
include 55.40 square miles of land and water with a slightly increased population density of
1,426.66 people per square mile (United States Census, 2000; American Community Survey,
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2015; United States Gazetteer Files, 2000 and 2015). This study includes an area extending for
150.27 square miles and containing much of the unincorporated areas adjacent to the city limits
as well as portions of the bordering municipalities of Springdale, Johnson, Farmington,
Greenland, Elkins, and Goshen.
There are very few studies in the literature which focus on economic segregation or
gentrification within small cities. Small cities may function differently than large metropolitan
areas because a relatively minor change can have a widely felt impact. College towns are
particularly unique because of the sensitivity of the city as a whole to any decision made by the
dominating institute of education. In Fayetteville’s case, the University of Arkansas is a state
school, rendering it above the jurisdiction of city ordinances or development standards. This in
combination with its central location causes an ongoing dichotomy between the university and
the surrounding neighborhoods which are always in danger of becoming casualties of expansion.
The data for this study is geographically divided by census block groups which don’t
always line up with city limits. Therefore, I have selected census block groups which at least
partially intersect city limits and which make geographical common sense as a coherent part of
the urban whole. Within this footprint, there are 56 block groups within the 2000 decennial
divisions (See Figure 1) and 51 within the 2010 decennial division (See Figure 2). That being
said, each inconsistency was linked by common boundaries. For instance, block group
051430110011 and 051430110012 from 2010 can be merged to match block group
051430110012 from 2000 perfectly. Likewise, block groups 051430107013, 051430107014,
and 051430107015 from 2000 can be merged to match block group 051430107012 from 2010
without overlapping or unaccounted for areas.
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Figure 1. 2000 United States Census Block Group boundaries.

Figure 2. 2010 United States Census Block Group boundaries.
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Using this technique to reconsolidate census block groups which were divided between
2000 and 2010 and also using block groups which were consolidated in 2010 even though they
may have been separate in 2000, the result, which can be seen in Figure 3, was 48 distinct
geographical areas which from here on out will be referred to as Consolidated Block Groups or
CBGs. The values from CBGs which may have contained multiple block groups in either the
2000 or 2010 census were averaged to create a single, comparable value for the CBG.

Figure 3. Consolidated Block Groups (CBGs).
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Methodology
Determining if there is a relationship between economic segregation and gentrification
will require three steps. The first two steps will be the measurement of gentrification and
economic segregation individually. The broad nature of the term “gentrification” and some of its
many meanings are discussed at length in the literature review portion of this paper, however for
this analysis it will be defined as an increase in property value disproportionate to that of the
study area as a whole. In order to quantify gentrification, I have created an index based on the
change in median rent and median assessed property values for each block group in the study
area for both 2000 and 2015.
Using Median Gross Rent (Dollars) data from the 2000 Decennial Census and the 20112015 American Community Survey 5-year estimates, the percentage of change was calculated
for each block group. Using Washington County Assessor data of assessed property value for
individual parcels, a median property value for each consolidated block group was calculated for
2001 and 2015 and the same calculation made to arrive at a rate of change in the median assessed
property value for each block group between 2001 and 2015 as described in (1) where vi refers to
the median property value in CBG i and 𝑟i refers to the median rent in CBG i.

(𝑣2 )𝑖 − (𝑣1 )𝑖
(𝑟2 )𝑖 − (𝑟1 )𝑖
𝛥𝑣𝑖 + 𝛥𝑟𝑖 = (
)+(
)
(𝑣1 )𝑖
(𝑟1 )𝑖
(1)
The rates of change for median rent and median assessed property values were then averaged to
create an index representing both aspects of the real estate market as shown in (2). This value
will be referred to from here on out as the Gentrification Index (G).

𝐺𝑖 =

𝛥𝑣𝑖 + 𝛥𝑟𝑖
2

(2)
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The measurement of economic segregation was further divided into four categories: the
segregation of poverty (P), the segregation of affluence (A), a segregation index (S), and Theil’s
Information Theory Index (H). The segregation of poverty was measured by determining the
percentage of households in each census block group that were earning less than $20,000 per
year in 2000 and 2015 according to Household Income data from the 2000 Decennial Census and
the 2011-2015 American Community Survey 5-year estimates. The rate of change between 2000
and 2015 was then calculated as a measurement of the change in the segregation of poverty for
each census block group. Likewise, the segregation of affluence was calculated using the
percentage of households in each census block that earn $100,000 per year or more before using
that data to calculate the change which occurred between 2000 and 2015. The Segregation Index
was calculated by adding A and P and then calculating the change in the sum as shown in (3).

Si = (A2 + P2)i - (A1 + P1)i
(3)
The last measurement of economic segregation being used in this analysis was calculated
using Theil’s Information Theory Index or Multi-Group Entropy Index which measures the
evenness of the distribution of multiple groups (Iceland, 2004). First entropy (E) is calculated
for the entire study area as shown in (4), where Пb refers to a particular income bracket’s
proportion of the population.
𝑏

𝐸 = ∑(П𝑏 ) ln[
𝑏=1

1
]
П𝑏
(4)

Next entropy is calculated for each CBG as shown in (5), where Пbi is a particular income
bracket’s proportion of the population within CBG i.
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𝑏

𝐸𝑖 = ∑(П𝑏𝑖 ) ln[
𝑏=1

1
]
П𝑏𝑖
(5)

Finally, H is calculated as the weighted average deviation of each CBG’s entropy from that of
the study area as a whole as shown in (6) where T is the population of the study area and ti refers
to the population of CBG i (Iceland, 2004).
𝑛

𝐻 = ∑[

𝑡𝑖 (𝐸 − 𝐸𝑖 )
]
𝐸𝑇

𝑖=1

(6)
H was calculated for each block group in both study years using the disaggregated Household
Income data from the 2000 decennial census and the 2011-2015 American Community Survey 5year estimates. Subsequently the 2000 scores were then subtracted from the 2015 scores, as
shown in (7), to measure the amount of change in distribution evenness.

𝛥Hi = (H2 - H1)i
(7)
The third step was to test for correlation between the Gentrification Index and each of the
four measures of economic segregation using Spearman’s Rank correlation coefficient which is
shown in (8).

6𝛴𝑑 2
𝜌 =1−( 3
)
𝑛 −𝑛

(8)

The goal of this final step is to determine the likelihood and strength of any relationship between
economic segregation and gentrification in the study area between 2000 and 2015.
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Additionally, a series of color maps were drawn to illustrate the geographical difference
in each of these calculations. The maps along with scatter plots including regression lines were
used for visual and spatial analysis. All calculations were performed in Microsoft Excel or
RStudio. Maps were made using Esri’s ArcGIS ArcMap and scatter plots were created using the
ggplot package in RStudio.
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Results & Analysis
According to the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, prices for rent of shelter were
44.23% higher in 2015 versus 2000. As shown in Figure 4, of the 48 Consolidated Block Groups
(CBGs), two had a decreased median rent value and 21 increased by less than the 44.23% rate of
inflation for shelter. Twenty-four CBGs had changes in median rent which were higher than the
inflation rate with six of those being more than twice the inflation rate. In 1 CBG the population
decreased to zero over this time period rendering this measurement null.

Figure 4. Change in median rent between 2000 and 2015.
The change in value per acre, shown in Figure 5 was positive in every CBG from 2000 to
2015. The net positive change was greater than 100% in 26 CBGs with six of those being higher
than 200% while 22 CBGs had an increase in median property value of less than 100%. Of
those, four increased by less than 50%.
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Figure 5. Change in median value per acre between 2000 and 2015.

Figure 6. The Gentrification Index (G) incorporates changes in property values and median rent
between 2000 and 2015.
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There is strong evidence of a weak positive correlation (ρ = 0.34, p-value = 0.02)
between the change in median rent from 2000-2015 and the change in median property value
from 2001-2015. The Gentrification Index (G), shown in Figure 6, is an average of those two
values and ranges from the lowest value of 0.22 to the highest value of 3.19 with an average of
0.89.

Figure 7. Change in Segregation of Poverty (P), or the percentage of households earning less
than $20,000 per year, between 2000 and 2015.
Despite inflation and a federal increase in the minimum wage, the percentage of
households in each CBG making less than $20,000 per year only declined by an average of
4.69%, from 30.52% to 25.82%. The number increased in 17 CBGs and, as can be seen in
Figure 7, increased by over 10% in five of those. CBG 40, which includes a few blocks just
north of the intersection of Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd. and Razorback Rd., had the highest
percentage of households earning less than $20,000 per year in income in 2000, 79.73%, and is
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the same CBG mentioned above as being excluded from our calculations due to a population of
zero in 2015 (down from 668 residents in 2000).
The percentage of households with income over $100,000 per year on the other hand
increased in 41 of the 47 CBGs with data for both 2000 and 2015 (see Figure 8). The average
increase was by 13.10% (from 8.27% in 2000 to 21.37% in 2015) with five CBGs increasing by
over 30%. Four CBGs had decreases in the percentage of households making over $100,000 per
year and two stayed at 0%.

Figure 8. Change in Segregation of Affluence (A), or the percentage of households earning at
least $100,000 per year, between 2000 and 2015.
Excluding the depopulated CBG 40, the number of CBGs with over 50% of households
earning either less than $20,000 per year or more than $100,000 per year climbed from 12 in
2000 to 18 in 2015. The average rose from 38.79% in 2000 to 47.20% in 2015.
Theil’s H, also known as the Multi-Group Entropy Index, measures as a distribution or
lack of distribution of the population of a specific area across multiple different groups (Iceland,
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2004). In general, a lower score indicates more entropy or a more diverse distribution of the
population while a higher score indicates a more segregated population. The average value of H
in 2000 was 0.05 which increased to 0.09 by 2015. The value of H increased in all but 5 of the
CBGs with data available for both years. While the maximum value of H in 2000 was 0.13, the
maximum value of H in 2015 was 0.23. Figure 9 shows the change in H in the study area
between 2000 and 2015.

Figure 9. Change in the Multi-Group Entropy Index (H) value between 2000 and 2015.
Generally, a greater increase indicates an increase in income segregation while a greater decrease
indicates an increase in income diversity.
There may be a negative correlation between the changes in segregation of affluence and
segregation of poverty between 2000 and 2015 as well as between changes in segregation of
affluence and Theil’s H. However, p-values are not low enough for these statements to be made
in confidence. Additionally, there appears to be weak, negative correlation between G and the
change in segregation of poverty from 2000 to 2015 with no significant correlation found
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between G and H or between G and the segregation of affluence. Although no correlation or
lack of correlation can be stated with confidence.
Table 1. Matrix showing correlation coefficients between the Gentrification Index and each
segregation variable.
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Discussion
For the majority of CBGs in Fayetteville, the median change in assessed property value
per acre from 2001 to 2015 was between 51% and 200%. This increase can mostly be attributed
to overall inflation in the growing Northwest Arkansas housing market, where the median value
of a house increased by 58% during the fifteen-year period (United States Census, 2000;
American Community Survey, 2015). The highest increases in median value are found in CBGs
which straddle the city limits and are adjacent to major transportation corridors leading in and
out of the city (e.g. N. Crossover Rd., E. Mission Blvd., W. Mt. Comfort Rd., and Hwy. 112
north of I-49) with the greatest increases along E. Huntsville Rd. and W. Wedington Dr. The
subdivision and subsequent development of large tracts of farmland into single-family homes
(and probably quite a bit of speculation) is most likely accountable for the majority of this
increase.
While the median assessed property value per acre increased in every CBG, increases
near the city center were generally between 100% and 200%. While this indicates that
gentrification could have been taking place in the inner-city neighborhoods, suburbanization was
clearly the larger economic factor driving property value change.
Median rent increases between 2000 and 2015 on the other hand are higher downtown
and in established neighborhoods within the vicinity of downtown. Of the six CBGs where
median rent increased by more than 90%, four are immediately downtown or near the University
of Arkansas campus. The increase was highest in the North Mt. Sequoyah and University
Heights areas. Both mid-century built and traditionally comprised of middle-class single-family
homes but which more recently have been transitioning into upper-middle class neighborhoods.
While this certainly indicates some gentrification red flags, it is worth noting that most of the
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CBGs which began with lower median rent had more modest increases in rent during this time
period. Interestingly, the area just south of the CBG which experienced the greatest increase in
median rent, and encompassing most of the Mt. Sequoyah neighborhood, was one of only two
CBGs to show a decrease in median rent. This is a historically mixed-density, mixed-income
neighborhood which has been trending towards more upper-middle class single family homes as
well, but the data shows that the effect has been an opposite one on rental cost.
Worth adding to this discussion is the CBG north of the intersection of Martin Luther
King Jr. Blvd. and Razorback Rd., which during this time period transitioned from one of the
cheaper CBGs in terms of median rent to being void of residences. University expansion
redeveloped all of the existing university and privately owned housing and so this CBG shows
no color on the graphic.
The areas in which the Segregation of Poverty (P) was most affected were all located
within a three-mile radius of the University of Arkansas campus. Those five CBGs which show
a 10% or higher increase in P are generally south and west of the university and include the main
campus itself. At least four of these areas have had a substantial amount of multi-family
development during the 15-year study period. The CBG in South Fayetteville which has had the
largest increase in P includes areas which have traditionally been used industrially or for
warehousing as a result of proximity to several railroad corridors, most of which are no longer in
use. This CBG also includes several older, working-class neighborhoods such as Fayette
Junction and Parksdale. During the study period there has been a significant amount of
development of greenfield sites and replacement of warehouses and industrial lots with large
apartment complexes. Additionally, the university’s athletic complex has seen significant and
steady expansion. The population of this CBG more than doubled from 2000 to 2015 with most
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of that population increase presumably accounted for in large apartment complexes geared
towards students. This most likely accounts for the jump from 29% to 51% of households
having an income of less than $20,000 per year.
Those four CBGs which show a 20% or greater decrease in P are generally located north
and east of the campus. While three of these four areas had moderate rent increases (between
46% and 68%), the area which experienced the largest decrease in P was the Mt. Sequoyah
neighborhood, which as mentioned above, experienced a decrease in median rent. According to
the data this is one of only two neighborhoods in the study area where P decreased to 0%.
Though it must be kept in mind that the American Community Survey data is based on a sample
and has a significant margin of error, still a drop from over 24% of households making less than
$20,000 per year to near 0% would be a significant indication of gentrification and could not be
explained by inflation alone. One explanation for this shift could be that these neighborhoods
are filling up with middle-class renters or homeowners who can no longer afford to live in some
of the other centrally located neighborhoods because of an increase in property values due to
affluent investment. This trickle-down or ripple effect theory (Florida, 2017, p. 73) of residential
sorting could be supported by looking at the change in Segregation of Affluence (A) which
shows that the same Mt. Sequoyah neighborhood had a 25% increase in the number of
households making over $100,000 per year.
There are ten other CBGs which had a 21% or greater increase in A, which could be a
reflection of the region’s economic success or increasing income inequality but is probably, at
least in large part, a result of the inflation of the American Dollar which was approximately 37%
between 2000 and 2015 according to the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. In addition to
Mt. Sequoyah the neighborhoods which experienced the highest increases include University
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Heights, a portion of Midtown, Gulley Park, and a portion of Rolling Hills but are mostly located
around the periphery of the city including all five of the areas noted above as having the highest
increases in property values.
Of the nine CBGs which experienced the greatest increase in S, which is the sum of A and
P, eight were heavily imbalanced. In other words, the increase in S was almost entirely due to an
increase in A (or in one case, an increase in P) but not the combination of the two. In fact, four
CBGs met or exceeded the threshold of a 22% change in S between 2000 and 2015 despite
having a negative value for P. Only one CBG is in this high increase group as a result of fairly
balanced increases in A and P. The neighborhood located northeast of the corner of Wedington
Dr. and Rupple Rd. had an increase of approximately 12% and 16% for A and P respectively.
Similarly, the five CBGs which experienced the greatest decrease in S were also
imbalanced as only one showed decreases in both A and P. The neighborhood north of North St.
between Leverett Ave. and Oakland Ave. had approximately a 4% decrease in A and an 8%
decrease in P while the other four CBGs which had decreases in S of -6% or greater all showed
increases in A. These data seem to suggest that economic segregation between neighborhoods is
increasing in Fayetteville but, as mentioned before, are likely skewed due to inflation and the
relative value of $20,000 or $100,000 in 2000 versus in 2015. The 16 income brackets used by
the U.S. Census Bureau for income data collection do not allow appropriate adjustment for
inflation.
The final measurement of segregation used in this study was the change in entropy for
each CBG as calculated using Theil’s H. While the average value of H increased by 0.04 during
the study period, there were seven CBGs in which the value of H decreased, indicating that
income levels became more evenly distributed. That being said, in five of those the decrease was
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less than 0.01. The area which saw the greatest decrease is that CBG which includes the
Fayetteville High School campus and is immediately south of the university. Traditionally this
area has been a mix of mid-density, multi-family housing and modest single-family homes but
has been gradually densifying as the single-family homes are being removed to make way for
university expansion as well as townhomes and large student oriented, multi-family
developments. Despite the change, the neighborhood has maintained economic diversity with an
H value of 0.058 in 2015, approximately 0.03 below average. Even with an increase of 0.01, the
CBG with the lowest H value is the neighborhood south of Gulley Park between E. Mission
Blvd. and N. Old Wire Rd., having a value of 0.027 in 2015. Interestingly the neighborhood is
largely composed of mid-sized, single-family homes, although there are some multi-family
developments. This traditionally suburban neighborhood has seen gradual increases in density
due to pockets of new urbanist subdivisions in recent years.
Most CBGs saw an increase in the value of H during the study period with several
showing significant increases. Ten had increases greater than 0.07 with two showing increases
greater than 0.11. The area with the greatest increase in H during the study period, also the area
with the greatest overall value of H in 2015, was the University of Arkansas campus. While this
CBG also includes a handful of single and multi-family dwellings, it encompasses all of the
largest university dormitories and is almost, if not entirely, occupied by students. This high H
value is likely a reflection of students typically having a low income or no income at all but the
significant increase in H during the study period is harder to explain. It could be indicative of
stagnant wages, compared to other industries, in the service industry jobs which employ many
students. It could also be a result of the large increase in the student population of the university
which has forced most upperclassmen, who would be more likely to have a job or a greater
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income than freshmen and sophomores, to seek housing off-campus due to diminished
availability.
Correlation

Figure 10. Regression line for relationship between Gentrification Index (G) and the
Segregation of Poverty (P) reveals the possibility of negative correlation.
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (𝜌) was calculated for the relationship between G
and each measure of segregation. The 𝜌 coefficient for the relationship between G and P
reflected a value of -0.26, an indication of potentially weak, negative correlation between the two
variables and yet the greatest indication of a relationship with G among the segregation
measures. Plotting the data and adding a linear regression line, as shown in Figure 10, confirms
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the negative association between G and P. Linear regression analysis also reveals an apparent
positive association between G and A, although the 𝜌 coefficient for that relationship is only
0.07.

Figure 11. Regression line for relationship between Gentrification Index (G) and the
Segregation of Affluence (A) reveals the possibility of positive correlation.
Neither linear regression analysis nor Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient indicate a
relationship between G and H (Figure 12) or between G and S (Figure 13). All that being said,
p-values were high across the board, meaning that no positive nor negative correlation, nor lack
thereof, between gentrification and segregation as defined or measured in this study could be
stated with any confidence. As described above in this discussion, strong patterns have not
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clearly emerged through visual analysis of this data portrayed via GIS mapping. Furthermore, a
low sample size of n=47 CBGs contributed to low values when testing for 𝜌.
Similarly, testing for 𝜌 between segregation variables reveals the possibility of weak,
negative correlation between A and P, with a 𝜌 coefficient of -0.28 as well as between A and H,
with a 𝜌 coefficient of -0.23. However, once again high p-values preclude the assertion of
confidence.

Figure 12. Regression line for relationship between Gentrification Index (G) and the Theil’s
Multi-Group Entropy Index (H) does not appear to indicate a relationship.
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Figure 13. Regression line for relationship between Gentrification Index (G) and the
Segregation Index (S) does not appear to indicate a relationship.
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Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to investigate potential correlation between gentrification
and income segregation in Fayetteville, Arkansas. A Gentrification Index was created using
property values and rent costs and then compared to multiple measures of income segregation
calculated for a 15-year study period. Finally, the results were mapped and plotted for visual
analysis and tested for correlation to determine if there appeared to be a relationship between
gentrification and income segregation in Fayetteville between 2000 and 2015.
The expectation was to find increasing levels of gentrification and decreasing levels of
income segregation, a ratio thought to be typical of areas in transition, meaning that
gentrification has begun to take place but has not yet resulted in mass displacement. Both
property values and rents increased dramatically over the 15-year period, even when compared to
inflation rates. Three out of four income segregation measures used, Segregation of Affluence,
the Segregation Index, and the Multi-Group Entropy Index, appeared to draw a picture of a city
increasingly segregated by household income level. The exception was the Segregation of
Poverty measure, which showed a slight reduction in areas with concentrations of households at
the lowest income levels. However, upon analysis there was little evidence of a relationship
between the phenomena.
The significance of these results is that there does not appear to be correlation between
gentrification and income segregation, as the terms are defined in this study, between 2000 and
2015 in Fayetteville, Arkansas. This could imply that gentrification is occurring in a way which
is not causing displacement or that it is not happening on a rapid or large enough scale to
contribute significantly to displacement. Alternatively, lower-income residents may have been
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dispersed in a pattern which did not register as increasing segregation due to the geographical
divisions used in the study or other limitations of the data.
The majority of the data derived from this study suggests that gentrification has an active
presence in Fayetteville, primarily in neighborhoods adjacent to the University of Arkansas or
downtown. The sharp increases in rents and property values paint a picture of an urban
environment where those who purchased property prior to the beginning of the timeline have
reaped benefits whereas those who do not own property are spending a larger portion of their
income on rent and face an uphill battle if home ownership is the goal. The greatest change,
however, is occurring on the periphery of the city, indicating that suburbanization is a more
powerful social organizing force. It is in these suburban neighborhoods where self-segregation
of the affluent is most apparent. The neighborhoods which appear the most stable are those
which are in-between. The lowest levels of gentrification and segregation, generally appear to be
in those areas which are not immediately adjacent to downtown or the university but which have
also been established for longer than two or three decades.
Limitations
Limitations of this study include the predefined boundaries in geographical and income
data, large margins of error within American Community Survey data, and logistical challenges
in measuring segregation and defining gentrification. United States Census data is a great
resource in the sheer quantity of publicly accessible records and the nearly comprehensive
sample size of decennial census data. However, it can provide limitations due to rigidly defined
categories. While a lot of information is available at the block level, income data is only
available down to the block group size which is frequently arbitrary and rarely reflects organic
neighborhoods. Additionally, income data is available in predefined brackets which do not allow
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for precise adjustments to be made in order to account for inflation, average household size, or
regional discrepancies. As described earlier, the changes in geographical boundaries between
2000 data and 2015 data, which used 2010 geography, was slight but did require some averaging
for block groups which had been combined or split.
Due to limitations in the frequency with which property value is assessed at the county
level, it was necessary to use American Community Survey data, which is very handy in that it is
available on a yearly basis. However, while operated by the U.S. Census Bureau, this data is a
survey and not a census and therefore the limited sample size means that there are significant
margins of error. American Community Survey data was further limited by a lack of estimates
available for some years in various block groups which meant using estimates available for the
closest available year.
The study period was limited due to its brevity and would benefit from additional
temporal points. However, while United States Census data has been collected for centuries, the
information has varied over the decades and data collected prior to 2000 is limited in digital
availability. The American Community Survey did not begin until 2005 and Washington County
Assessor data is available only as far back as 2000. Furthermore, the urban geography of
Fayetteville changed dramatically in the late 20th and early 21st centuries as it grew from a town
into a small city. Many of the neighborhoods discussed in this study would have been nonexistent or unrecognizable even as recently as 1990. It is also worth mentioning that the study
period essentially sandwiched the great recession of the late 2000s. The recession and recovery
could have had a significant impact on gentrification and income segregation during the study
period due to an impaired economy, slower population migration, and the inflated (and then
stunted) housing market.
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The subject of the research presented limitations of its own. Gentrification, as described
in the literature review and measurement sections above, is hard to define. While the decision
was made to focus on the economic aspect of gentrification alone for this study, this ignores the
cultural impact and depersonalizes the findings. Measuring segregation also presents logistical
problems when measuring many groups, in this case sixteen. It can be difficult to determine what
may represent segregation and what should be considered even sorting when so many groups are
involved.
Finally, while there is of course a correlation between income and wealth, they are not
the same thing. Wealth also includes property, assets, savings, inheritances, investments, etc. It
is entirely possible to be affluent and have a very low income or even no income at all. This is
particularly relevant when discussing populations with high numbers of retirees or students. In
Fayetteville there are many students who support themselves by working in addition to studying,
however it’s important to remember that there are also quite a few students who have other
sources of money and may register as being impoverished in the data used for this study but in
reality might have access to wealth. That being said, wealth is much harder to measure than
income and the data is simply not available in the same quantity and with the precision as that of
income data.
Further Research
In order to form a more comprehensive picture of the social and economic movement in
Fayetteville it would be beneficial to perform the same measurements again after data from the
2020 decennial census has become available and new property value data is available from the
Washington County Assessor. A greater number of temporal points of data available should
result in greater clarity in existing trends or the lack thereof. The five years which have passed
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since the most current data in this study have seen sustained rapid growth for the city including
the continuation of suburban development and a dramatic increase in infill projects.
Additionally, it would be valuable to see this analysis performed on block group data for
the entire Northwest Arkansas urbanized area, including Springdale, Rogers, Bentonville and the
many small, adjacent towns and bedroom communities. The region functions as a single unit in
some regards with the housing market in particular spilling across city limits. Larger trends may
very well become apparent if more potential outlets of displacement are studied.
The ultimate goal for furthering this research of course would be to bring comprehension
to a point of fostering solutions. The more that is known about how cities and social structures
within them work, the more confidently policy can be written to guide urban development and
management in a way that creates a better place for those all who live there.
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Appendix
Table: Consolidated Block Groups
Consolidated
Block Group
(CBG)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Census Block GEOID
2000

2010

51430101023
51430101041
51430101042
51430101043
51430101044
51430101052
51430101053
51430101063
51430101064
51430101065
51430101066
51430101071
51430101072
51430101073
51430101074
51430105033
51430105061
51430105062
51430105072
51430105073
51430105074
51430105081
51430105082
51430105083

51430101023
51430101041
51430101042
51430101043
51430101044
51430101052
51430101053
51430101063
51430101064
51430101061
51430101062
51430101071
51430101072
51430101073
51430101074
51430105033
51430105061
51430105062
51430105072
51430105073
51430105071
51430105081
51430105082
51430105083

Consolidated
Block Group
(CBG)
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Census Block GEOID
2000

2010

51430105084
51430106001
51430106002
51430106003
51430106004
51430107011
51430107012
51430107016
51430107021
51430107022
51430107023
51430108001
51430108002
51430108003
51430108004
51430109003
51430110012
51430111014
51430111015
51430111016
51430111017
51430111022
51430111023
51430113004

51430105084
51430106001
51430106002
51430106003
51430106004
51430107011
51430107012
51430107016
51430107021
51430107022
51430107023
51430113006
51430113003
51430113001
51430113002
51430113005
51430110012
51430111014
51430111011
51430111012
51430111013
51430111022
51430111023
51430113004
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Table: Property Value and Rent
Median Value per Acre
CBG
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

2001

2015

Change

58582.30

227545.00

231635.00

428117.50

223962.50

450927.00

302308.00

723014.00

201930.50

420400.00

51668.50

128135.00

192020.00

424393.00

293895.50

649567.00

168962.70
196482.50
226964.50
420706.00
218469.50
76466.50
232373.00
355671.50
206714.00
248298.50
186267.00
132675.50
177637.00
222066.00
179522.00
161415.00
366380.00
80033.40
528550.00
199189.00
234283.00
22051.55
13962.25
40771.30
167546.00
262119.00
214237.00
204874.00
148320.50
243156.50
383248.00
246113.00
255890.50
224433.50
419309.00
388111.00
661132.00
410305.50

419025.50

625739.50

406219.50

654518.00

291629.50

477896.50

266286.00

398961.50

352342.00

529979.00

351964.00

574030.00

247714.00

427236.00

258773.00

420188.00

240073.00

606453.00

16418.70

96452.10

173409.00

701959.00

397269.00

596458.00

381126.00

615409.00

10337.25

32388.80

16601.50

30563.75

96913.70

137685.00

448413.00

615959.00

236567.00

498686.00

186106.00

400343.00

200184.00

405058.00

175423.50

323744.00

263883.00

507039.50

277112.00

660360.00

350475.00

596588.00

350543.50

606434.00

235392.00

459825.50

328751.00

748060.00

326129.00

714240.00

384868.00

1046000.00

259722.50

670028.00

Median Rent
%
Change
2.8842
0.8482
1.0134
1.3916
1.0819
1.4799
1.2101
1.2102
0.4933
0.6112
0.6387
0.4982
0.5042
0.6309
0.7247
0.6238
1.5261
4.8745
3.0480
0.5014
0.6147
2.1332
0.8410
0.4207
0.3736
1.1080
1.1512
1.0234
0.8455
0.9215
1.3830
0.7022
0.7300
0.9534
1.2755
1.1901
1.7178
1.5798

2000
469.00
775.00
720.00
570.00
602.00
553.00
749.00
567.34
621.58
708.00
572.00
652.00
900.00
440.00
865.58
610.00
535.00
546.00
796.90
730.00
629.00
529.00
470.00
612.00
687.00
411.00
421.00
516.00
541.00
473.00
404.96
417.00
494.00
558.00
609.00
456.00
386.00
324.00

2015

Change

806.00 337.00
1667.00 892.00
632.00 -88.00
852.00 282.00
718.00 116.00
981.00 428.00
1158.00 409.00
723.00 155.66
818.00 196.42
1048.00 340.00
944.00 372.00
978.00 326.00
1210.00 310.00
683.00 243.00
1176.00 310.42
680.00
70.00
732.00 197.00
967.00 421.00
1108.00 311.10
920.00 190.00
699.00
70.00
681.00 152.00
284.00 -186.00
725.00 113.00
941.00 254.00
665.00 254.00
632.00 211.00
1060.00 544.00
1094.00 553.00
597.00 124.00
613.00 208.04
608.86 191.86
596.54 102.54
829.00 271.00
1043.00 434.00
922.00 466.00
736.00 350.00
465.00 141.00

%
Change
0.7186
1.1510
-0.1222
0.4947
0.1927
0.7740
0.5461
0.2744
0.3160
0.4802
0.6503
0.5000
0.3444
0.5523
0.3586
0.1148
0.3682
0.7711
0.3904
0.2603
0.1113
0.2873
-0.3957
0.1846
0.3697
0.6180
0.5012
1.0543
1.0222
0.2622
0.5137
0.4601
0.2076
0.4857
0.7126
1.0219
0.9067
0.4352
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Median Value per Acre
CBG
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
Mean:
Min:
Max:

Median Rent

2001

2015

Change

235017.00

574540.00

199431.00

496051.00

77097.35

136648.50

132011.00

303438.00

339523.00
296620.00
59551.15
171427.00
123058.50
117924.00
66416.10
40550.40
127104.05
250352.00

%
Change
1.4447
1.4873
0.7724
1.2986
0.9132
0.7562
1.5695
6.1008
2.5934
1.0461

224525.86
447801.56 223275.70
6646.70
30563.75 13962.25
448413.00 1046000.00 661132.00

1.3071
0.3736
6.1008

134757.50

257816.00

155952.00

273876.00

42317.40

108733.50

6646.70

47197.10

49009.95

176114.00

239328.00

489680.00

2000

2015

Change

%
Change
0.6740
-1.0000
0.4348
0.3297
0.2683
0.5749
0.9605
0.2761
0.6486
0.0534

408.00
336.00
586.00
458.00
492.00
501.00
354.00
518.00
424.00
450.93

683.00 275.00
No Data -336.00
840.77 254.77
609.00 151.00
624.00 132.00
789.00 288.00
694.00 340.00
661.00 143.00
699.00 275.00
475.00
24.07

551.01
324.00
900.00

809.94 254.36 0.4705
284.00 -186.00 -0.3957
1667.00 892.00 1.1510
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Table: Income Segregation of Poverty and Affluence
CBG
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Segregation of Poverty (P)
2000
2015
Change
0.0895 -0.0512
0.1407
0.1506
0.0879 -0.0627
0.0000 -0.2406
0.2406
0.2640
0.0972 -0.1667
0.1573
0.0298
0.1275
0.1789
0.0968 -0.0820
0.1069
0.0184
0.0884
0.2117
0.1671 -0.0446
0.1313
0.0322
0.0990
0.0588
0.0000 -0.0588
0.2427
0.0652
0.1775
0.0805
0.1378
0.0574
0.0631 -0.0160
0.0792
0.2397
0.2925
0.0528
0.1407
0.0454
0.0953
0.1175
0.0657 -0.0518
0.3140
0.0071
0.3069
0.2088
0.1165 -0.0923
0.0447 -0.1273
0.1720
0.1329
0.2951
0.1622
0.4464
0.1193
0.3270
0.1994
0.2232
0.0238
0.1475 -0.0643
0.2117
0.2211
0.0979 -0.1232
0.1005 -0.1220
0.2225
0.3346
0.5271
0.1925
0.5057
0.0532
0.4525
0.2056
0.0693 -0.1364
0.2602 -0.0922
0.3524
0.4676
0.3894 -0.0783
0.7289
0.0468
0.6821
0.6023
0.3994 -0.2029
0.3130 -0.1069
0.4199
0.2790
0.0602 -0.2189
0.1731 -0.0458
0.2189
0.5121
0.4564 -0.0557
0.4028 -0.1252
0.5280
0.6160
0.5193 -0.0967

Segregation of Affluence (A)
2000
2015
Change
0.5640
0.3159
0.2481
0.2741
0.4524
0.1783
0.3900
0.2510
0.1390
0.1201
0.2404
0.1202
0.3285
0.1343
0.1941
0.1507
0.2590
0.1083
0.5006
0.2522
0.2484
0.0311
0.1204
0.0893
0.3603
0.1623
0.1981
0.3193
0.6128
0.2934
0.0628 -0.0294
0.0922
0.1862
0.3709
0.1847
0.4272
0.3348
0.0923
0.1571
0.2332
0.0761
0.4221
0.3248
0.0973
0.1497
0.3929
0.2432
0.1376
0.1129
0.0248
0.0518
0.3776
0.3257
0.3335
0.2706
0.0630
0.0380
0.1574
0.1194
0.0307
0.0144
0.0162
0.0706
0.1022
0.0317
0.1915
0.1244
0.0671
0.0238
0.1084
0.0846
0.2090
0.1397
0.0694
0.0116
0.0000 -0.0116
0.0743
0.0147
0.0596
0.1752
0.4903
0.3151
0.1244
0.1065
0.0179
0.0426
0.0000 -0.0426
0.0000 -0.0030
0.0030
0.0090
0.0323
0.0233
0.0759
0.0374
0.0385
0.0469
0.2481
0.2012
0.2665
0.1528
0.1137
0.0000
0.1494
0.1494
0.1263
0.0898
0.0365
0.0000
0.1339
0.1339
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CBG
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
Mean:
Min:
Max:

Segregation of Poverty (P)
Change
2000
2015
0.3912 -0.2334
0.6246
0.7973 No Data
-0.7973
0.1347 -0.1161
0.2508
0.4344
0.3824 -0.0521
0.6051
0.0922
0.5129
0.2868
0.5102
0.2234
0.3309 -0.0362
0.3671
0.1767
0.0429 -0.1338
0.4160 -0.1097
0.5257
0.6486
0.8571
0.2085

Segregation of Affluence (A)
Change
2000
2015
0.0370
0.0142
0.0228
0.0000 No Data
0.0000
0.2026
0.1623
0.0402
0.0000
0.0235
0.0235
0.0238
0.0238
0.0000
0.0138
0.0437
0.0300
0.2950
0.1576
0.1374
0.0804
0.3125
0.2321
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

0.3052

0.2582

-0.0469

0.0827

0.2137

0.1310

0.0588

0.0000

-0.2406

0.0000

0.0000

-0.0426

0.7973

0.8571

0.2234

0.3193

0.6128

0.3348
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Table: Segregation Index, Theil’s Information Theory Index, and Gentrification Index
CBG
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Segregation Index (S)
2015
2000
Change
0.888
0.6535
0.2647
0.4247
0.5403
0.1156
0.3797
0.3900
0.0103
0.3841
0.3376
-0.0465
0.3217
0.4858
0.1641
0.3296
0.3558
0.0262
0.3368
0.6074
0.2706
0.2428
0.2875
0.0447
0.2971
0.4916
0.1945
0.3782
0.6128
0.2346
0.2696
0.3054
0.0358
0.2667
0.5088
0.2421
0.1715
0.4903
0.3188
0.3968
0.5257
0.1289
0.1926
0.5627
0.3701
0.2672
0.4586
0.1914
0.3317
0.4516
0.1199
0.2607
0.4940
0.2334
0.2350
0.3783
0.1433
0.1709
0.4525
0.2816
0.3432
0.4770
0.1338
0.2699
0.3254
0.0554
0.2788
0.3390
0.0602
0.2449
0.2063
-0.0386
0.2919
0.3095
0.0176
0.3463
0.5271
0.1809
0.5121
0.5800
0.0679
0.3808
0.5596
0.1787
0.3703
0.3846
0.0143
0.5103
0.3894
-0.1209
0.6850
0.7289
0.0439
0.6114
0.4317
-0.1796
0.4584
0.3889
-0.0695
0.3259
0.3083
-0.0177
0.3326
0.4396
0.1070
0.5121
0.6058
0.0937
0.5645
0.5291
-0.0354
0.6160
0.6531
0.0372

Theil's Information Theory Index (H) Gentrification
Index (G)
2000
2015
Change
0.0609 0.1060
0.0451
1.8014
0.1080 0.1017
-0.0063
0.9996
0.0471 0.1165
0.0694
0.4456
0.0313 0.0864
0.0551
0.9432
0.0464 0.0387
-0.0077
0.6373
0.0188 0.0352
0.0164
1.1270
0.0845 0.0832
-0.0013
0.8781
0.0372 0.0683
0.0311
0.7423
0.0600 0.0546
-0.0054
0.4047
0.1013 0.1605
0.0592
0.5457
0.0250 0.1371
0.1121
0.6445
0.0667 0.0976
0.0309
0.4991
0.0727 0.0920
0.0193
0.4243
0.0170 0.0272
0.0102
0.5916
0.0670 0.0521
-0.0149
0.5417
0.0328 0.0612
0.0284
0.3693
0.0150 0.0304
0.0154
0.9472
0.0365 0.0550
0.0185
2.8228
0.0350 0.0931
0.0581
1.7192
0.0484 0.0712
0.0228
0.3808
0.0386 0.1213
0.0827
0.3630
0.0342 0.0973
0.0631
1.2103
0.0340 0.1152
0.0812
0.2226
0.0566 0.1364
0.0798
0.3027
0.0234 0.0595
0.0361
0.3717
0.0485 0.1233
0.0748
0.8630
0.0378 0.0763
0.0385
0.8262
0.0288 0.1101
0.0813
1.0388
0.0238 0.0545
0.0307
0.9338
0.0464 0.0825
0.0361
0.5918
0.0957 0.1811
0.0854
0.9484
0.0921 0.0935
0.0014
0.5812
0.0348 0.0325
-0.0023
0.4688
0.0186 0.0928
0.0742
0.7196
0.0172 0.0818
0.0646
0.9941
0.0521 0.0758
0.0237
1.1060
0.0515 0.0718
0.0203
1.3123
0.0727 0.0799
0.0072
1.0075
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CBG
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
Mean:
Min:
Max:

Segregation Index (S)
2015
2000
Change
0.6474
0.4282
-0.2191
0.7973 No Data
-0.7973
0.2911
0.3373
0.0462
0.4344
0.4059
-0.0285
0.5129
0.6289
0.1160
0.3006
0.5539
0.2533
0.5045
0.6259
0.1214
0.2571
0.3554
0.0983
0.5257
0.4160
-0.1097
0.6486
0.8571
0.2085
0.3879

0.4720

0.0840

0.1709

0.2063

-0.2191

0.7973

0.8571

0.3701

Theil's Information Theory Index (H) Gentrification
Index (G)
2000
2015
Change
0.0755 0.0575
-0.0180
1.0593
0.1305
N/A
-0.1305
0.2437
0.0132 0.0458
0.0326
0.6036
0.0544 0.0902
0.0358
0.8141
0.0588 0.1308
0.0720
0.5907
0.0383 0.0883
0.0500
0.6655
0.0173 0.0740
0.0567
1.2650
0.0173 0.0720
0.0547
3.1884
0.0532 0.1019
0.0487
1.6210
0.1171 0.2306
0.1135
0.5497
0.0499
0.0132
0.1305

0.0882
0.0272
0.2306

0.0400
-0.0180
0.1135

0.8869
0.2226
3.1884
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